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We use aggregation theory to investigate the link between one-consumer 
and multi-consumer economies under a quasi-linear class of preferences. Our 
study is carried out in the context of the neoclassical growth model. The quasi-
linear preferences considered are additive in consumption and leisure and linear 
in leisure. We first show that in a homogeneous agents economy, the individual 
hours worked are not uniquely determined. We then demonstrate that the 
indeterminacy can be resolved by introducing heterogeneity. For example, 
idiosyncratic shocks to productivities or imperfect substitutability of labor restore 
the uniqueness of equilibrium. As a special case, our analysis includes the 
indivisible labor model by Hansen (1985). 
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Much of the research in macroeconomics is built around the representative
agent abstraction. The hope is that the replacement of many heterogeneous
consumers with just one consumer will not be essential for the results. In
some cases, the eﬀect of heterogeneity on the aggregate predictions of the
models is, indeed, either absent, as is under Gorman’s (1953) exact aggre-
gation, or quantitatively unimportant, as in, e.g., Krusell and Smith (1998).
However, there are also examples in the literature in which the implications of
one-consumer models do not carry over to heterogeneous agents economies,
see Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), Maliar and Maliar (2001, 2003). To iden-
tify the cases in which the representative agent assumption can be safely
used, one needs to gain some understanding of how heterogeneity can aﬀect
aggregate dynamics.
Apart from the aggregate behavior of the actual economies, economists
are interested in distributive issues. Several papers were able to gain useful
insights into the determinants of the distributional dynamics by exploiting
the link between one-consumer and multi-consumer economies, see Chatter-
jee (1994), Caselli and Ventura (2000), Maliar and Maliar (2000, 2001). Such
literature proceeds by constructing a representative consumer and uses the
knowledge of the aggregate dynamics to restore the evolution of distributions.
This paper employes aggregation theory to investigate the connection
between one-consumer and multi-consumer economies under one particular
class of preferences, namely, the quasi-linear one. Quasi-linear preferences are
those that are additive in all commodities and linear in some commodities.
The assumption of quasi-linear preferences is common in incentive literature
a n di np u b l i cﬁnance. Furthermore, it is essentially the basis of the indivisible
labor model by Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), which is one of the
benchmark macroeconomic models. A characteristic feature of quasi-linear
preferences is that they are not strictly convex. Under such preferences, the
existence and uniqueness of an interior optimal allocations is not, in general,
guaranteed.
Our analysis is carried out in a general equilibrium framework. We place
ourselves in a production economy with inﬁnitely lived agents, who derive
utility from two commodities that we interpret as consumption and leisure.
The momentary utility function of each agent is quasi-linear: it is additive
in consumption and leisure, and linear in leisure.
We begin by considering the economy with homogeneous agents. We
3show that such an economy has an indeterminacy of equilibrium, in the
sense that one can construct inﬁnitely many allocations for individual hours
worked, satisfying all the equilibrium conditions. It is therefore possible
that agents who have identical fundamentals (i.e., endowments, preferences
and productivities), and who are placed in the same environment, make
diﬀerent labor-leisure decisions. The assumption of multiple consumers is
important for the indeterminacy result. What distinguishes a multi-consumer
from a one-consumer economy is essentially that, in the former case, the
production possibility frontier is linear from the private perspective, whereas
in the latter case, it is strictly convex. We shall also emphasize that the
indeterminacy described above arises in an optimal economy.1 Furthermore,
the indeterminacy occurs in our model, even if the number of agents is ﬁnite.2
Our main ﬁnding is that indeterminacy can be ruled out by the intro-
duction of heterogeneity in labor. The role of heterogeneity is, perhaps, best
understood by looking at the following two examples: First, we assume that
individual labor productivities are subject to shocks. If markets are com-
plete, then the optimal allocations for individual working hours are at the
corners: an agent works the maximum number of hours possible when pro-
ductivity (and, consequently, the wage) is high, and she spends all of her
time endowment on leisure when it is low. As a result, the individual hours
worked are uniquely determined. Secondly, we assume that labor of diﬀerent
individuals is not perfectly substitutable in production. The individual bud-
get constraints, which are linear under the assumption of perfect substitutes,
then become strictly convex. Thus, the indeterminacy is again resolved. It is
worth emphasizing that not every type of heterogeneity restores the unique-
ness of equilibrium. For example, indeterminacy is present in an economy
w h e r ea g e n t sa r eh e t e r o g e n e o u si ni n i t i a le n d o w m e n t s ,p r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e t e r s
and productivities, if the relative productivities do not change over time.
The property that is common to all heterogeneous agents economies con-
sidered, is that their aggregate dynamics can be characterized by represen-
tative consumer models. However, this is not aggregation in the sense of
Gorman (1953): the structure of the representative consumer models, which
we construct in the paper, depends on speciﬁc assumptions about heterogene-
1In this respect, our paper diﬀers from the existing literature, where indeterminacy
occurs as a result of market imperfections, e.g., increasing returns, incomplete markets,
asymmetric information (see Benhabib and Farmer, 1999, for a survey).
2Kehoe and Levine (1985) argue that the indeterminacy of equilibrium may arise be-
cause of the assumption of inﬁnite number of an inﬁnitely lived consumers.
4ity and does not, in general, coincide with the structure of the correspond-
ing homogeneous agents counterparts.3 In particular, it is possible that the
preferences of the representative consumer are strictly convex even though
the preferences of all heterogeneous agents are quasi-linear (i.e., not strictly
convex). The aggregation results presented in this paper can be viewed as
further examples of ”imperfect aggregation”, described in Maliar and Maliar
(2003).4
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes a competitive equi-
librium economy in which agents have a quasi-linear type of preferences.
Section 3 presents the corresponding planner’s economy. Section 4 estab-
lishes indeterminacy of equilibrium under the assumption of homogeneous
agents. Section 5 discusses two examples in which indeterminacy is ruled out
by introducing heterogeneity, and ﬁnally, Section 6 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
Time t is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite, t ∈ T,w h e r eT = {0,1,2,...}.
The economy consists of a representative ﬁrm and inﬁnitely-lived agents with
names in the set S, which is normalized by
 
S ds =1 . The agents diﬀer in
three dimensions: endowments, preferences and productivities (skills).
We denote the skills of agent s in period t by β
s
t. The distribution of skills




+. We assume that Bt follows a station-
ary ﬁrst-order Markov process. Speciﬁcally, let   be the Borel σ-algebra on
 .D e ﬁne a transition function for the distribution of skills Π :  × →[0,1]
on the measurable space ( , ) such that: for each z ∈  , Π(z,·) is a prob-
ability measure on ( , ),a n df o re a c hZ ∈  , Π(·,Z) is a  -measurable
function. We shall interpret the function Π(z,Z) as the probability that the
next period’s distribution of skills lies in the set Z given that the current
distribution of skills is z, i.e., Π(z,Z)=P r{Bt+1 ∈ Z | Bt = z}. The initial
distribution of skills B0 ∈ is given.5
3As is known from Blackorby and Schworm (1993), the assumption of a quasi-linear
utility function is inconsistent with Gorman’s (1953) type of aggregation, unless the utility
function is linear in all commodities.
4This type of aggregation is based on a representation of the social utility function
proposed by Constantinides (1982); and it is employed in Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), and
in Maliar and Maliar (2001, 2003).
5Note that the above formulation allows for aggregate uncertainty in the distribution
of skills, as idiosyncratic disturbances can be correlated across agents.
5The distribution of skills Bt is the only exogenous state variable of our
economy. We assume that there is a complete set of markets, i.e., that the
agents can trade Arrow securities, contingent on all possible realizations of
the distribution of skills.
An agent s ∈ S derives utility from consumption, cs
t, and leisure, ls
t.W e
focus exclusively on the case in which the momentary utility functions of all
agents are quasi-linear: additive in consumption and leisure, and linear in


















where the variables ns
t and n are working hours and the total time endow-
ment, respectively.6 We assume that vs is strictly increasing and strictly
concave and that As < 0.







































where E0 is the operator of conditional expectation. The discount factor is
δ ∈ (0,1). The wage per unit of labor supplied by agent s is ws
t.T h ea g e n t
owns capital stock ks
t and rents it to the ﬁrm at the rental price rt. Capital
depreciates at the rate d ∈ (0,1]. The portfolio of Arrow securities bought by





Z∈ . The price of security pt (Z) is to be
paid in period t for the delivery of one unit of the consumption good in period
t +1if Bt+1 ∈ Z. Initial endowments of capital, ks
0, and Arrow securities,
ms
0 (B0), are given. The total endowment is (1−d+r0)ks
0 +ms
0 (B0) ≡ κs
0 ⊂
R+.
The representative ﬁrm rents capital and hires labor to maximize period-
by-period proﬁts. Capital input is given by kt =
 
S ks
tds. Labor input is
determined by a function h, which depends on both, individual hours worked
and skills. Consequently, the problem solved by the ﬁrm is
max
kt, {ns








6Here, and further on in the paper, ∼ means ”is identical up to an additive constant”.










The production function, f, has constant returns to scale, is strictly in-
creasing in both arguments, continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly concave, and
satisﬁes the appropriate Inada conditions. The labor input function, h,h a s
constant returns to scale, is strictly increasing in all arguments, continuously
diﬀerentiable and concave.
Deﬁnition. A competitive equilibrium in the economy (1) − (4) is a se-
quence of contingency plans for the consumers’ allocation, the ﬁrm’s allo-
cation and the prices, such that, given the prices, the allocation of each
consumer solves the utility maximization problem (1), (2), the allocation of
the ﬁrm solves the proﬁt maximization problem (3), (4); also, capital and
labor markets clear and the economy’s resource constraint is satisﬁed. The
equilibrium quantities are to be such that cs
t,w s
t,k t,r t ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ ns
t ≤ n
for all t, s.7
3 Planner’s economy
According to the First Welfare Theorem, in an economy with complete mar-
kets and without distortions, like ours, a competitive equilibrium is Pareto
optimal and can be restored as the optimal choice of a social planner, who














































where ct is the aggregate consumption, and {λ
s}
s∈S ⊂ RS
+ is the distribution




7The formulated setup is a heterogeneous agents variant of Kydland and Prescott’s
(1982) model. Under the assumption of strictly convex preferences, similar heterogeneous
agents settings have been studied in, e.g., Kydland (1984, 1995), Atkeson and Ogaki
(1996), Maliar and Maliar (2001, 2003).
8The constraint 0 ≤ ns
t ≤ n plays an important role in our analysis because the model
has, in general, corner solutions for hours worked.
7A competitive equilibrium in the heterogeneous agents economy (1)−(4)
















s.t. ct + kt+1 =( 1− d)kt + f (kt,h t). (7)
To be precise, for any given distribution of endowments in the decentralized
economy (1) − (4), there exists a set of welfare weights in the planner’s
economy (5)−(7) such that a competitive equilibrium allocation is a solution
to the planner’s problem. We should point out that the notion of the social
utility function (5) does not, in general, imply aggregation in the sense of
Gorman (1953), since U is allowed to depend not only on aggregate quantities
but also on the distributions of welfare weights and skills.9
With the assumptions of convex preferences and production sets, we have
the Second Welfare Theorem, which is the converse of the First Welfare
Theorem. Speciﬁcally, any Pareto optimal allocation can be reached as a
competitive equilibrium with appropriate transfers of wealth (i.e., initial en-
dowments). In our model, the correspondence between Pareto optimal and
competitive equilibrium allocations is identiﬁed by the expected lifetime bud-
get constraints. Such constraints are obtained by applying forward recursion
























Given any Pareto optimal allocation, we can compute the left side of (8)
for each s. As a result, we obtain uniquely determined transfers of wealth
supporting a given Pareto optimal allocation.
It is convenient to characterize the social utility function U by using the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
























9See Maliar and Maliar (2003) for a discussion.
10For the derivation of this constraint, see Maliar and Maliar (2001).
8where V is deﬁned by
 
S cs













































< 0 ⇒ ns
t =0
> 0 ⇒ ns
t = n
=0⇒ 0 ≤ ns
t ≤ n
; (11)
and where V1 and W1 denote the ﬁrst-order partial derivatives of V and W
with respect to ct and ht, correspondingly.
Proof. See Appendix. 
As follows from Proposition 1, the optimal allocation for the individual
working hours in the planner’s economy can be either interior or at corners.
With the following proposition, we establish that the interiority of the plan-
ner’s allocation for working hours implies the interiority of the corresponding
allocation in the decentralized economy, and vice versa.
Proposition 2 The optimal allocation for individual hours worked is inte-
rior in the decentralized economy (1)−(4) if, and only if, it is interior in the
associated planner’s problem (5) − (7).
Proof. See Appendix. 
4 Homogeneous agents: indeterminacy
We ﬁrst consider the economy (1) − (4) populated by agents with identical
fundamentals (i.e., endowments, preferences and skills) such that vs = v,
As = A, κs
0 = k0 and β
s
t =1for all s. We assume that the labor input
is given by the sum of individual hours worked, ht =
 
S ns
tds,a n dt h a tt h e
economy consists of more than one agent.
As follows from Proposition 1, if an equilibrium is interior, then (11) holds
with equality. Given that
 
S λ
sds =1 ,w eh a v eλ
s =1for all s.F r o m(10),w e
9obtain that cs
t = ct for all s. Moreover, the economy admits a representative






∼ v(ct)+Aht.( 1 2 )
As has already been shown in Hansen (1985), the aggregate equilibrium al-
location {ct,h t,k t+1}t∈T is uniquely determined by (6), (7), (12).
Nevertheless, individual hours worked, {ns
t}
s∈S
t∈T, are not uniquely deter-
mined. Indeed, optimality condition (11) does not contain ns
t and, thus,
imposes no restriction on the choice of working hours except for 0 ≤ ns
t ≤ n
for all s and t. The other conditions to be satisﬁed in equilibrium are market
clearing in labor, ht =
 
S ns
tds, and expected lifetime budget constraint (8).
The former restricts the sum of individual working hours within each period,
whereas the latter does so across periods. We demonstrate that these two
conditions are not suﬃcient to identify individual labor choice.
Proposition 3 If an interior equilibrium in the homogeneous agents econ-
omy (1)−(4) exists, then an inﬁnite number of equilibrium allocations exists
for individual hours worked.
Proof. See Appendix. 
What is the source of the indeterminacy of the distribution of working
hours? At the individual level, working hours enter linearly in both the
preferences and the budget constraint. From the perspective of the agent,
h o u r sw o r k e di nd i ﬀerent periods are perfect substitutes. Consequently, the
agent is indiﬀerent between any sequences of working hours leading to the
same lifetime disutility from working. At the same time, the working hours
of diﬀerent individuals are perfectly substitutable in production. From the
point of view of the economy as a whole, any subdivision of working hours
among agents is optimal as long as it leads to the optimal aggregate labor
input in all periods.
The assumptions that are essential for the existence of indeterminacy
are that the economy lasts for more than one period and that it consists of
more than one agent. In a one-period economy, individual working hours are
uniquely determined by budget constraint (8): all agents consume the same
amount, cs
t = ct, and spend the rest of their endowment on leisure. In turn,
in a one-agent economy, the equilibrium is unique because the individual
10working hours suppled by the agent coincide with the labor input demanded
by the ﬁrm, ns
t = ht for all t.11 The individual budget constraint, which
is linear in the multi-consumer model, becomes strictly convex in the one-
consumer setup.
Our analysis has a direct implication for the indivisible labor model by
Hansen (1985). In such a model, the time allocated to the market job can
only have one of two values, i.e., some ﬁxed number of hours or zero hours.
Instead of choosing hours worked, an agent decides on the probability of being
employed. Whether the agent gets the job or not is determined by a lottery,
which is won with the probability chosen by the agent. Regardless of the
realization of the employment lottery, the agent is paid the expected labor
income (the one corresponding to the probability of employment chosen).
It is assumed that there is a continuum of ex-ante identical agents whose
utility functions are additive in consumption and leisure and logarithmic in
both consumption and leisure. As formulated in Hansen (1985), the problem







t [log(ct)+Aαt log(1 − h0)] (13)
s.t. ct + kt+1 ≤ (1 − d + rt)kt + wtαth0, (14)
where αt is the probability of being employed, the total time endowment of
the agent is equal to one, and h0 is the indivisible number of hours supplied
to the ﬁrm by an employed agent. As shown in Hansen (1985), the aggregate
equilibrium allocation in the indivisible labor model (13), (14) is described by
the planner’s problem (6), (7), (12) and it is uniquely determined. Regarding
the individual optimal allocation, however, our analysis suggests that the
optimal choice for individual probability of employment, αt, is not uniquely
determined. At the individual level, the probability enters linearly in both
the preferences (13) and the budget constraint (14).T h i sf e a t u r eg i v e sr i s e
to an indeterminate equilibrium.
11Indeed, consider the First Order Condition (FOC) of (1), (2) with respect to working
hours. With identical agents, we have v  (cs
t)wt = A,w h e r ewt = ∂f (kt,h t)/∂kt.I f
there is only one agent, then ht = ns
t, which allows us to identify ns
t.H o w e v e r ,i ft h e r ei s
more than one agent, we only know ht =
 
S ns




115 Ruling out indeterminacy by introducing
heterogeneity in labor
In this section, we analyze the implications of heterogeneous agents versions
of the model. We ﬁrst show that, similarly to the case of identical agents, the
optimal consumption allocations are uniquely determined in heterogeneous
agents economies. We subsequently demonstrate that introducing labor het-
erogeneity can rule out the indeterminacy of the individual labor choice.
5.1 Consumption choice


















For a given set of weights {λ
s}
s∈S and aggregate consumption ct,t h e r ei s






solving (15).G i v e n t h e f u n c t i o n V1,t h e
optimal consumption of each agent is uniquely determined by (10).B e l o w ,
we show an example in which V can be derived explicitly.
Example 1. Assume that vs (cs
t)=( cs
t)
γ , where γ ∈ (0,1).E q u a t i o n s








































Furthermore, combining the above expressions for cs






This formula determines the optimal distribution of consumption. 
5.2 Labor choice
To characterize the optimal labor choice, we are to make speciﬁc assumptions
on how working eﬀorts of diﬀerent individuals are aggregated into the labor
12input. We begin by discussing the case in which the agents’ eﬀorts are
perfectly substitutable in production. Later in the section, we will consider
the case of imperfect substitutes.
5.2.1 Perfect substitutes









We ﬁrst consider the case in which the decentralized economy (1) − (4),
(16) has an interior equilibrium, or equivalently, the planner’s problem (5)−
(7), (16) has an interior solution (see Proposition 2). In such a case, we have
the following result.
Proposition 4 a). In order an interior solution to the planner’s problem
(5) − (7), (16) exists, it is necessary that β
s
t = βtbs for all t and s.



















d). There exists an inﬁnite number of optimal allocations for individual hours
worked.
Proof. See Appendix. 
The result that only one set of weights is consistent with an interior equi-
librium is related to the well-known property of quasi-linear utility function
that a change in wealth aﬀects the demand for commodities that enter the
utility function linearly but does not aﬀect the demand for any other com-
modities. In the context of our model, this property means that the optimal
choice of individual consumption is independent of the distribution of initial
endowments. In the one-period version of our model, for example, the Engel
curves are parallel zero-sloped straight lines with the origin (consumption in-
12This assumption is common in the heterogeneous agents literature, e.g., Kydland
(1984, 1995), Aiyagari (1994), Krusell and Smith (1998), Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez and
Ríos-Rull (1998), Maliar and Maliar (2001).
13tercept) determined by vs,A s and bs.13 Given that the optimal consumption
of agents is the same for all distributions of initial endowments, we always
have the same set of welfare weights.
The existence of the representative consumer may seem surprising since,
as it is known from Blackorby and Schworm (1993), the assumption of quasi-
linear utility function is inconsistent with aggregation unless the utility func-
tion is linear in all commodities. We are able to escape this negative impli-
cation of Blackorby and Schworm’s (1993) analysis because our aggregation
requirement is weaker than the one they use. Speciﬁcally, we allow for the
case in which the social utility function depends not only on aggregate quan-
tities but also on the distribution of welfare weights. We therefore construct
a representative consumer, not for all, but only for the unique set of wel-
fare weights that corresponds to an interior equilibrium. The deﬁnition of
a representative consumer used in Blackorby and Schworm (1993) is more
restrictive as it requires the preferences of the representative consumer to be
the same for all sets of welfare weights.
As follows from Proposition 4, if we restrict our attention to interior
equilibrium, the indeterminacy does not disappear after the introduction of
heterogeneity.14 We shall point out that the existence of an interior equi-
librium requires imposing the speciﬁc restriction that the relative skills of
agents do not change over time. If such a restriction is not satisﬁed for some
s and t, then the corresponding optimal allocations are not interior. Below,
we argue that having the optimal allocations for working hours at corners
can help to restore the uniqueness of equilibrium.
According to (11), the agent’s optimal labor choice in the presence of
the corner solutions is as follows: to work the maximum possible number of
hours n if the current labor productivity β
s
t is strictly higher than Asλ
s/W1,
to work zero hours if β
s
t is strictly lower than Asλ
s/W1, and to work a certain
number of hours ns
t ∈ [0,n],i fβ
s
t is equal to Asλ
s/W1. The aggregate labor
13A class of utility functions leading to parallel Engel curves is called similarly quasi-
homothetic. The property of quasi-homotheticity is known to be both necessary and
suﬃcient for aggregation in the sense of Gorman (1953). Therefore, if the economy studied
in this section has an interior equilibrium, then it admits a representative consumer,
independently of speciﬁc assumptions about individual characteristics {vs,A s,b s}
s∈S.
14Kydland (1984) studies a similar two-agent model under the Cobb-Douglas (strictly
concave) utility function. He ﬁnds that the model reproduces empirical observations that
high-productivity agents work more and experience less volatility of labor than the low-
productivity. Because of the indeterminacy, similar questions cannot be asked if the utility
function is quasi-linear. Neither can they be addressed in the indivisible labor framework.


















In order to have a unique equilibrium, it is necessary to insure that the set of
agents, who have interior equilibrium allocations, has a measure zero. This
can be done by assuming that in each period, individual skills are randomly
drawn from some distribution with a continuous density.
Example 2. Consider an economy populated by ex-ante identical agents




t,w h e r eβt is the aggregate component, and bs
t is the idiosyncratic







Note ﬁr s tt h a te x - a n t ei d e n t i c a la g e n t sh a v ei d e n t i c a lw e l f a r ew e i g h t s ,
λ
s =1for all s.D e n o t e b y bt the value of idiosyncratic component that
makes the agents indiﬀerent between working or not, i.e., bt = A/(βtW1),

















Note that under the set of agents whose optimal allocations for working hours
are interior (i.e., whose skills are bs
t = bt) has a measure zero.





































The planner’s problem (6), (7) with the social utility function, deﬁned by
(15), (19), yields the aggregate equilibrium allocation. If such an allocation
is given, the threshold condition uniquely determines who works and who
15A similar example is considered in Cho (1995).
15does not. Note that the function W is strictly concave, even though the
utility functions of all heterogeneous agents are quasi-linear. 
We should also mention that the assumption that agents are ex-ante iden-
tical is not essential for resolving the indeterminacy. The optimal allocations
for individual hours worked will be unique, independently of a speciﬁcd i s -
tribution of welfare weights across agents.
5.2.2 Imperfect substitutes
Suppose now that the individual working eﬀorts are not perfectly substi-
tutable in production so that the marginal labor input of an agent s can



















In this case, optimality condition (11) provides S equations containing S
unknown individual hours worked, {ns
t}
s∈S.B e l o w , w e s h o w a n e x a m p l e
in which this system of equations (11) has a unique solution. Thus, the
assumption of imperfect substitutes can help us to resolve the indeterminacy
of the individual labor decisions.16











, ε ∈ (−∞,1).
The parameter ε determines the degree of substitutability and complemen-
tarity among the labor inputs of diﬀerent agents. In the limits, ε =1and
ε →− ∞ ,w eh a v ep e r f e c ts u b s t i t u t e s(16) and perfect compliments, respec-
tively.
Suppose that equilibrium is interior, i.e., condition (11) holds with equal-
ity. By ﬁnding the derivative ∂ht
∂ns
t of the CES function, substituting it into
(11) and solving with respect to ns


















16If the economy is populated by an inﬁnite number of agents, then the equilibrium
is unique up to the allocation of a zero-measure subset of agents. This is because such







































∼ Atht. The aggregate equilibrium
allocation can again be computed by solving the planner’s problem (6), (7).
The individual hours worked are uniquely determined by (21). 
The property that helps us restore the uniqueness of equilibrium in this
case is the strict convexity of individual budget constraints.
6C o n c l u d i n g c o m m e n t s
This paper investigates the consequences of quasi-linear preferences (addi-
tive in consumption and leisure, and linear in leisure) in a dynamic general
equilibrium model with multiple consumers. To characterize the distribu-
tional dynamics, we employ the aggregation theory. Our main ﬁndings are
as follows: If consumers are homogeneous, there is indeterminacy of equi-
librium: the model does not produce sharp predictions about the individual
hours worked. However, the indeterminacy does not, in general, survive the
introduction of heterogeneity in labor. Two examples of labor heterogeneity
that restore the uniqueness of equilibrium are idiosyncratic shocks to skills
and imperfect substitutability of labor in production. All the above results
also apply to the indivisible labor model by Hansen (1985).
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7 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
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∂ht
+ ηt =0 , (27)
19where µt, ηt, ςs
t, ζ
s








t ≥ 0 and ns
t ≤ n, respectively.
By substituting (22) into (26) and solving with respect to cs
t,w eo b t a i n
(10).C o n d i t i o n s(23)−(25) together with (27) yield (11). The fact that the
individual utility functions are additive in consumption and working hours
implies that the social utility function, U, is additive in aggregate consump-
tion and labor, i.e., U can be written as the sum of two subfunctions, V and
W,a si si n(9). This can be shown by substituting (10) and (11) into the
objective function in (5). 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
The FOCs of the consumer’s utility maximization problem (1), (2) with
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t are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to budget con-
straint (2) and restrictions ns
t ≥ 0 and ns







∂ht .N o t et h a te q u a t i o n(28) implies that for any two agents














for all Z ∈  . (34)






the standard implication of the complete markets assumption that the ratio
of marginal utilities of any two agents remains constant in all periods and
states of nature. Without loss of generality, we normalize the multipliers by  
S λ
sds =1 .
Assume that the equilibrium allocation for individual working hours in
the decentralized economy is interior, i.e.,   ς
s
t =0and   ζ
s














For the planner’s solution for individual working hours to satisfy (35),w e
must have that, in (23), ςs
t =0and ζ
s
t =0for all s. Hence, the planner’s
allocation for individual hours worked is interior.
T h es a m et y p eo fa r g u m e n t sc a nb eu s e dt op r o v et h ec o n v e r s es t a t e m e n t :




s, we obtain that the individual working hours satisfy (35), which implies
that for all s,   ς
s
t =0and   ζ
s
t =0in (31), i.e., the equilibrium allocation for
working hours in the decentralized economy is interior. 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
We assume that the economy consists of more than one agent. Let
{ct,h t,k t+1}t∈T be the aggregate optimal allocation. First of all, note that
the symmetric allocation such that all agents behave identically, cs
t = ct and
ns
t = ht for all s,s a t i s ﬁes all the optimality conditions. Let us show that
there exists also an inﬁnite number of optimal allocations with asymmetric
labor choices.




t∈T such that   cs
t = ct for all s and   ns
t = ht











τ = hτ + ε,   n
s  
τ = hτ − ε,
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τ+1 = hτ+1 −
ε
δ
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21where ε > 0 is any number such that   ns 
τ ,   ns  
τ ,   ns 
τ+1,   ns  
τ+1 ∈ [0, n].T h ea b o v e
construction is always possible under our assumption of interior equilibrium,
which guarantees that the equilibrium allocations for the aggregate labor
input, ht, are interior for all t.
Observe that the asymmetric allocation leads to the same aggregate labor
input as the symmetric one, since we have   ns 
t +  ns  
t = ht+ht for t ∈ {τ,τ +1 }.
Given that the level of output does not change, the equal consumption,   cs
t =
ct for all s, is feasible in the asymmetric case. Furthermore, note that in the
asymmetric and symmetric cases, all agents, including i ∈ {s ,s   }, get the














= E0 {... + δ
τA(hτ + δhτ+1)+...}.
As the asymmetric allocation implies the same expected lifetime utility for
a l la g e n t sa st h es y m m e t r i co n e ,t h i sa l l o c a t i o ni so p t i m a l . 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4











for all t.( 3 6 )
Therefore, an interior equilibrium is possible only if the relative skills of
agents do not change over time, i.e., β
s
t = βtβ
s for all s.
b). The formula for λ








t into (11), expressing λ




sds =1 ,w eo b t a i nW1 = At and, thus, W ∼ Atht.
d). The proof is parallel to that of Proposition 3. We again assume that
the economy consists of more than one agent. Let {ct,h t,k t+1}t∈T be an
aggregate optimal allocation. Note that in the economy with heterogeneous
agents, the symmetric allocation is, in general, not a solution. The optimal
distribution of consumption across agents, {cs
t}
s∈S
t∈T, is the one which satisﬁes
condition (10). The optimal distribution of working hours, {ns
t}
s∈S
t∈T,i s ,h o w -
ever, not identiﬁed by the corresponding optimality condition (11).W eﬁrst
construct one distribution {ns
t}
s∈S
t∈T satisfying all of the optimality conditions,
and then show that an inﬁnite number of other optimal distributions exists.
One optimal distribution of working hours can be constructed by assum-
ing that each agent works a ﬁxed share of aggregate labor input, ns
t = nsht
22for all t and s. The optimal shares are identiﬁed by individual expected
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t for all s and
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where ε > 0 is a number such that   ns 
τ ,   ns  
τ ,   ns 
τ+1,   ns  
τ+1 ∈ [0, n].
As in Proposition 3, the distributions {ns
t}
s∈S
t∈T and {  ns
t}
s∈S
t∈T lead to the
same aggregate labor input in all periods, so that output and consumption
are also the same. Furthermore, {ns
t}
s∈S
t∈T and {  ns
t}
s∈S
t∈T imply the same life-





t∈T is optimal. 
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